Virtualization-based security (VBS) is a Windows security architecture that uses the hardware-assisted hypervisor to create an isolated region of memory that the normal operating system kernel cannot read or modify. Within this region, Windows runs security functions and stores secrets so that they remain protected even if an attacker gains kernel-level control of the main system.
VBS is not a single feature but a foundation for other protections. Credential Guard, memory integrity, System Guard and Enhanced Sign-in Security all depend on it, and on modern Windows 11 hardware it is enabled by default when the device meets the requirements.
How virtualization-based security isolates memory
VBS works by placing the Hyper-V hypervisor beneath Windows and using it to split the system into Virtual Trust Levels (VTLs). The ordinary Windows kernel, drivers and applications run in VTL0, while a small secure kernel and protected processes run in VTL1, a mode Microsoft calls Virtual Secure Mode.
The hypervisor controls memory through Second Level Address Translation (SLAT), which maps guest physical memory to real physical memory. Because the hypervisor decides which pages VTL0 may access, code in VTL0 cannot map VTL1 pages, no matter how privileged it is. The IOMMU extends the same rule to devices, blocking direct memory access (DMA) attacks from malicious peripherals.
| Component | Runs in | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Hypervisor | Below both trust levels | Enforces memory separation and page permissions |
| Normal kernel | VTL0 | Runs Windows, drivers and ordinary services |
| Secure kernel | VTL1 | Minimal kernel that manages isolated processes |
| Isolated User Mode | VTL1 | Hosts trustlets such as LsaIso.exe for credential isolation |
| VBS enclaves | VTL1 | Let applications protect their own code and data |
The key design principle is least trust in the kernel. Traditional Windows security assumed that kernel mode was the highest authority; VBS moves that authority one level down, so a compromised driver or kernel exploit no longer grants access to everything.
Features built on virtualization-based security
Several Windows security features are consumers of VBS and cannot run without it. Each uses the isolated environment for a different purpose, either to hide secrets or to enforce integrity rules that the normal kernel could otherwise bypass.
| Feature | What VBS protects | Threat addressed |
|---|---|---|
| Credential Guard | NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets | Pass-the-hash and credential theft tools |
| Memory integrity | Kernel code integrity checks | Unsigned or tampered kernel drivers |
| System Guard | Boot and runtime measurements | Firmware and early-boot tampering |
| Enhanced Sign-in Security | Windows Hello biometric templates | Injection or replay of biometric data |
| Hardware-enforced stack protection | Kernel shadow stacks | Return-oriented programming attacks |
Memory integrity, also called hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI), is the most visible example: it validates drivers inside VTL1 and uses hypervisor page tables to ensure that kernel memory is never both writable and executable. The details of each feature belong to their own entries; what matters here is that VBS supplies the isolation they all rely on.
Hardware and firmware requirements for VBS
VBS requires a 64-bit processor with virtualization extensions and several platform features that let the hypervisor enforce isolation securely. Without them, Windows reports VBS as available but not running, or omits it entirely.
| Requirement | Examples | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| CPU virtualization | Intel VT-x, AMD-V | Runs the hypervisor beneath Windows |
| SLAT | Intel EPT, AMD RVI | Lets the hypervisor control memory mappings |
| IOMMU | Intel VT-d, AMD-Vi | Blocks DMA access to protected memory |
| UEFI Secure Boot | UEFI 2.3.1 or later | Prevents a malicious boot loader from subverting the hypervisor |
| TPM 2.0 | Discrete or firmware TPM | Seals secrets and supports measured boot |
| MBEC or GMET | Intel Kaby Lake, AMD Zen 2 and later | Reduces the performance cost of memory integrity |
Virtualization must also be enabled in the firmware settings, which some vendors ship turned off. Processors without mode-based execution control can still run memory integrity, but Windows must emulate the feature, which causes a noticeably higher performance overhead.
Enabling and verifying VBS in Windows
Administrators can confirm the state of VBS in System Information (msinfo32), where the line Virtualization-based security shows Running, Enabled but not running, or Not enabled, together with the list of active security services. The same data is available through the Win32_DeviceGuard WMI class for fleet reporting.
- Group Policy: Computer Configuration, Administrative Templates, System, Device Guard, Turn On Virtualization Based Security.
- Intune and MDM: the VirtualizationBasedTechnology and DeviceGuard policy settings configure VBS at scale.
- Registry: the
EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurityvalue under the DeviceGuard control key, typically used for testing. - Windows Security app: Device security, Core isolation, which exposes the memory integrity toggle to end users.
Policies can be configured with UEFI lock, which stores the setting in firmware variables so that malware or a local administrator cannot simply disable VBS through the registry. UEFI lock is deliberately hard to reverse and should be tested before broad deployment.
Performance, compatibility and common misconceptions
The main trade-off of VBS is a modest performance cost and occasional driver or software incompatibility. On current processors the overhead is usually small for office work, while some games and latency-sensitive workloads show single-digit percentage drops, more on older CPUs.
| Symptom | Likely cause | Recommended fix |
|---|---|---|
| Memory integrity cannot be turned on | Incompatible legacy driver | Update or remove the driver listed in the Windows Security app |
| VBS shows Enabled but not running | Virtualization disabled in firmware | Enable VT-x or AMD-V and the IOMMU in UEFI settings |
| Older virtual machine software fails | Hypervisor conflict | Use a version that supports the Windows Hypervisor Platform |
| Lower frame rates in games | Memory integrity on a CPU without MBEC | Weigh the risk before disabling; prefer newer hardware |
- VBS is not antivirus: it does not scan files and complements Microsoft Defender rather than replacing it.
- VBS does not require the Hyper-V role: it uses the hypervisor without installing virtual machine management tools.
- VBS does not stop all attacks: user-mode malware and phishing remain effective against ordinary user data.
The idea in brief
Virtualization-based security gives Windows a locked room inside the computer that even the most powerful part of the system cannot enter. Passwords, sign-in data and integrity checks are kept in that room.
If an attacker takes over the main system, they still face a wall enforced by the processor itself. They may control the house, but they cannot open the safe. The price is a small amount of speed and the need for reasonably modern hardware.
A practical scenario
A mid-sized accounting firm with 300 Windows 11 laptops suffers a phishing incident in which an attacker gains local administrator rights on one machine and runs a credential-dumping tool against the LSASS process, hoping to collect domain credentials and move to the file servers.
Because the IT team had deployed VBS through Intune with Credential Guard and memory integrity enabled with UEFI lock, the NTLM hashes and Kerberos secrets live in the isolated LsaIso.exe trustlet in VTL1. The tool returns only encrypted blobs that cannot be reused, and an attempt to load a vulnerable signed driver to disable protections is blocked by memory integrity.
The attacker is confined to the single laptop. The security team reimages it within hours, resets the affected user password and confirms through msinfo32 reports that VBS is running on every device, closing the incident without lateral movement.